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LABOR LAW - LIMITATION ON PICKETING
AS A FORM OF FREE SPEECH
Prosecutrix, who was employed at an establishment in Roanoke,
passed through picket lines manned by defendant and others, who
were striking employees of the concern. Defendant led the singing
of a song in which the words "whore" and "scab" were directed at
prosecutrix, causing her such mental upset that she became ill and
unable to continue work. Defendant was prosecuted under Sec. 1,
Chap. 229, Acts of 1946 (now VA. CODE ANN. 40-64, 1950),
which provides in part that interference or attempt to interfere with
another in his exercise of the right to work by use of "insulting or
threatening language" shall be a misdemeanor. Defendant was
convicted in trial court. On appeal, held, affirmed. The statute is
constitutional, being within the police power of the state, and not
trespassing on the right of free speech, for the latter right is not
absolute but subject to the exception of certain undesirable classes
of speech. McWhorter v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 857, 63 S. E.
2d 20 (1951).
Far from being protected as a form of free speech, picketing was
once considered by American courts to be a tort, readily enjoinable
by the employer whose business was being injured, whether or not
the picketing was attended by violence.1 Passage of §20 of the
Clayton Act of 1914 created, as far as business in interstate com-
merce was concerned, a prohibition against the use of injunctions
to stifle "peaceful persuasion" in labor disputes. This provision was
interpreted by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1921 Tri-City case 2
to allow limited peaceful picketing by non-employees of the business
picketed.
In the 192 0's the emphasis was on how far the legislature could
go in granting the privilege to picket free from injunctive
restraint. In Truax v. Corrigans the court found that an Arizona
anti-injunction statute denied due process of law to an employer
harassed by picketing accompanied by abusive language in the form
of handbills and other printed matter.
The 1937 Senn case' affirmed the right of a state to legalize
peaceful picketing. Justice Brandeis spoke of the privilege granted
as one of free speech. But it was not until the 1940 Thornhill v.
Alabama decision5 that the court shifted its emphasis from privilege
to right, holding in that case that peaceful picketing was a form of
free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from state
infringement. In 1941 the Swing6 case extended this protection to
stranger picketing.
The court later recognized the right of a state to enjoin picketing
"enmeshed with violence", 7 to localize picketing to the area of the
business involved in the dispute,' and to enjoin peaceful picketing
where it furthers a combination in restraint of trade.9 In a 1942
case unrelated on its facts to picketing," the Supreme Court stated
the doctrine relied on in the instant case, upholding the conviction
of a Jehovah's Witness who, because of his use of the charges
"damned Fascist" and "damned racketeer", had been indicted under
a statute forbidding offensive language in a public place. The
punishment of vse of such socially undesirable classes of speech as
the profane, the insulting, and the libelous was thought by the court
never to have raised any constitutional problem.
In the 1943 Cafeteria case,"1 however, the court refused to allow
an injunction where peaceful picketing was accompanied by the use
of signs giving the false impression that the pickets were former
employees of the concern and where the pickets accused the con-
cern of selling bad food and "aiding the cause of Fascism." This,
said the court, was only loose language and part of the give and
take involved in any labor dispute. The more recent Terminiello
decision 12 protected as free speech utterances which "stirred people
to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of
unrest", so long as they did not directly constitute a breach of the
peace. The case did not involve a labor dispute, but shows how far
the court will go in safeguarding what it considers to be funda-
mental liberties.
Statutes making it unlawful to interfere by force or intimida-
tion with the right of another to work have been held constitutional
by a number of higher state courts 3 The only case in which such
a statute seems to have reached the U. S. Supreme Court is
Michigan v. Washburn,' and there the court denied an appeal from
a decision upholding the statute's constitutionality. The statute
contained no prohibition against insulting words as does the
Virginia statute, and the facts involved intimidation by a mob with
clubs, rather than by women with insulting words.
The decision in the instant case, based on decisions not involving
labor, comes close to conflict with the Cafeteria decision. Since the
Virginia Statute of Insulting Words already adequately protects
the public from the use of abusive language, it must be readily
seen, as the court stated, that the' instant statute was designed to
protect the individual in his right to work. How far in that direction
the legislature may go, when so doing restricts the freedom of labor
to picket, is a question which the Supreme Court of the United
States must finally answer. In doing so it will decide whether a
statute such as was applied in the McWhorter case is a valid pro-
tection under the police power of the right to work, or is an uncon-
stitutional restriction of labor's right to free expression on the
picket line. In either case it will not be the abstract limits of free
speech that determines the issue, but rather a weighing of the
economic and legal forces in the labor-management struggle as a
whole.
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